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INTRODUCTION 
State Governor Pete Wilson, who wields line-item veto power over the state 
Budgeting budget, has proposed a November 1992 ballot initiative that would give 
and Welfare himself and future governors more control over California's fiscal blue-
Mothers prints. The bulk of his proposed initiative is devoted to revising benefits 
for welfare recipients, but two of its sections address overall state budg-
eting. 
Simply put, a goal of the governor appears to be to short-circuit the 120-
member legislative process in favor of the chief executive's single voice in 
times of budget crises. The governor could take command over spending 
cutbacks under circumstances controlled, to a great extent, by the gover-
nor's own decisions. 
This analysis looks at the budgeting changes proposed by the planned 
initiative. We have solicited opinions from public-policy experts, academi-
cians and other informed observers, with no stake in the outcome, and this 
document reflects their comments and observations. Our aim is to jump-
start an informed public discussion of these significant, if somewhat 
obscure, changes in the way California spends its money. We offer these 
comments from policy and budgeting authorities as stepping stones for 
further debate. 
California's governors have the ability to make deep imprints on state 
budgets and the many layers of government they fuel. The governor's 
budget proposals each year become the framework used by the Legislature 
in crafting its own version of the plan. The budget's crucial underpinnings 
- revenue and cost estimates - are supplied by the administration. 
Through the line-item veto, the chief executive has a final word in shaping 
the product, sometimes molding it to his initial proposals. 
No veto Governors can reduce or eliminate any spending proposals approved by 
overrides the Legislature, except in areas constitutionally or statutorily protected, 
since 1979 but cannot add dollars before signing legislative bills or new budgets. 
Overrides of vetoed items require a two-thirds vote from both legislative 
houses. No gubernatorial veto has been overridden in California since 
1979. 
Governor Wilson's initiative must garner 615,958 signatures from regis-
tered voters to qualify for the general-election ballot. The final deadline 
is June 11, 1992, but the secretary of state's office has asked that signa-
tures be submitted by April 17. 
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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND TAXPAYER 
PROTECTION ACT OF 1992 
Budget Governor Wilson calls his initiative the "Government Accountability and 
Sections Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992." The attorney general has given it the 
title used by elections officials: "Welfare. Budget Process. Initiative Con-
stitutional Amendment and Statute." 
Its budgeting changes would: 
• Require the governor to submit his or her proposed budget to the 
Legislature by March 1 each year instead of by Jan. 10. 
• Suspend the salaries, travel and living expenses oflegislators and 
the governor if the Legislature fails to return a budget bill to the 
governor by the constitutional deadline of June 15. 
• Permit the governor to declare a fiscal emergency and reinstate the 
prior-year budget, with some increases, when a new budget has not 
been signed by the start of the fiscal year on July 1. The governor 
could make budget-balancing cuts that take effect in 30 days unless 
a new budget is signed. 
• Permit the governor to declare a fiscal emergency if revenues, costs 
or both are off by 3 percent after the new fiscal year starts. Budget-
balancing cuts identified by the governor would take effect in 30 
days unless the Legislature by two-thirds vote passes an alternative 
plan and the governor signs it. 
• Permit the governor, during a fiscal emergency, to issue an execu-
tive order to furlough or cut the salaries of state employees who are 
not covered by union-negotiated contracts to save up to 5 percent of 
their pay. 
"These budget reforms will help ensure enactment of a timely and balanced 
budget, and will provide substantial taxpayer protection against 'autopilot' 
spending increases," Wilson explained in the 1992-93 Governor's Budget 
Summary. 
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Sections 4 and 5, printed below, contain the governor's proposed budget-
ing changes. Existing constitutional provisions proposed for deletion are 
printed in strikeout type. New proposals are printed in underscore type. 
SECTION 4. Section 12 of Article IV, of the California Constitution is amended to 
read: 
12. (a) Within the #l~t ten days ef each ealeAdar year, Ihe Governor shaii....Q:i 
March 1 of eqcb calendar yegr. submit to the Legislature. with an explanatory mes-
sage. a budget for the ensuing fiscal year containing Itemized statements for recom-
mended State expenditures and estimated State revenues. If recommended expen-
diture exceed estimated revenues, the Governor shall recommend the source from 
which the additional revenues sl:1etlle mn be provided. 
(b) The Governor and the Governor-elect may require a State agency, officer or 
employee to furnish whatever information Is deemed necessary to prepare the 
budget. 
(c) The budget shall be accompanied by a budget bill itemizing recommended 
expenditures. The bill shall be introduced Immediately In each house by the persons 
chairing the committees that consider appropriations. The Legislature shall pass the 
budget bill by midnight on June 15 of each year. Notwithstanding Article Ill. section 4. 
Article IV. section 4. if the Legislature fqlls to oass a budget bill by June 15. the Gover-
nor god the members oftbe legislature shall forfeit all salqry. travel expenses. and living 
exoenses until such time as a budget bill Is ogssed god signed by the Governor. No 
compensation shall be pqid retroactively to the Governor or the members of the 
Legislature for salqrv. trqyel expenses. and living expenses forfeited under the oroyj-
slons of this section. 
(d) No bill except the budget bill may contain more than one Item of appropria-
tion. and that for one certain. expressed purpose. Appropriations from the General 
Fund of the State, except appropriations for the public schools. are void unless passed 
In each house by roll call vote entered In the journaL two thirds of the membership 
concurring. 
(e) The Legislature may control the submission. approvaL and enforcement of 
budgets and the filing of claims for all State agencies. 
SECTION 5: Sections 12.2. 12.5 and 12.7 of Article IV of the California Constitution 
are added. to read: 
12.2 (a) Whenever the budget bill bas not been oossed god signed by July 1. 
the Governor mqy declare g state of fiscal emergency. When a fiscal emergency has 
been declgred. the prior yeqr budget. adlusted as required by Article XIII. section 25. 
Article XIII B. sections 6 god 8. Article XVL section 8. and stgte debt service. shall 
become the stqte • s operational budget and shall remain In effect uotf! the legislature 
Passes god the Governor signs a budget bill. In order to bring ontlclooted revenues 
and exoendltures for the fiscal year Into bglqnce. the Governor may lmmedlqtely oro-
pose reductions In any cateqorv of expenditure. lncll!ding goy state entltiemeot. 
except expenditures required by Ar11cle XIII. Sectjon 25. Article XIIIB. Sections 6 god 8. 
funding tor education qs proylded In Article XVL section 8. god stqte debt service. 
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(b) Any reductions proposed under subdivision (0) shall become effective 30 days 
after the oroposalls transmitted to the Legislature unless. prjor to the end of the 3D-day-
calendar period. the Legislature passes the budget bill and the bill Is signed by the 
Governor. 
J 2.5 (g) After the budget bill has been enacted. tbe Governor mgy declare a state 
of flscql emergency god. In order to bring anticipated State General Fund revenues 
and exoeodltures tor the fiscal yeqr Into balance, mqy reduce any cgteqorv of expen-
diture. Including any stqte entitlement. except expenditures p(Qtected by Article XIII. 
Section 25. Article XIII B. sections 6 god 8. funding for education as provlded In Article 
XVL section 8. and state debt service If at tbe end of goy auarter: 
ill Cumulative tlscql year Stqte General Fund cash receipts fall at leqst three percent 
{3%2 below revenues as estimated by the Department of Finance upon enactment of 
the budget: or 
ro Cumulative fiscal year State General Fund expenditures exceed budgeted amounts 
by three percent (3%): or 
Ql Cumulative fiscal year State General Fund cgsh receipts fall qt least one god one-
half percent 0-1/2%2 below revenues gs estimated by the Deoartment of Finance 
upon enactment of the budget god cumulative fiscal year exoendilures exceed budg-
eted amounts by gt legst one god one-half percent c J -1 /2%). 
For ourooses of fbis provision. 0 augrter is goy three month oeriod ending Seotem-
ber 30. December 31. or March 31. 
(b) Apy reduction proposed under subdivision {g) shall become effective 30 days 
after tbe prooosql Is transmitted to the Leqislgture unless. prior to the end of the 30-day-
cqleodar oerlod. the Legislgture enacts in each house by roll cqll vote entered In the 
jouroql. two tblrds of the membership concurring. alternate legislation to bring antici-
pated revenues and expenditures for the fiscal year into bglapce and that leqjs!atlon 
js signed by the Governor. 
12.7 (Q) When a state of fiscal emergency has been declared pursuant to Sections 
12.2 or 12.5. the Governor mqy. by Execunve Order. reduce tbe salaries of state 
employees or furlough stqte employees. provided that the total reduction from such 
gctions does pot exceed five percent <5%) of go employee's sq!qrv In any ooy period. 
(b) The Goyemor mqy not reduce fbe salary of or furlough a state employee during 
the agreed uooo term of a Memorandum of Understanding that hqs been negotiated 
pursuant to Chapter J 0.3 {commencing with Secljon 3512). Division 4. Title 1 of fbe Gov-
ernment code. which covers tbe terms god conditions of emoloymeot tor such em-
plovee I unless tbe Memorandum of Understanding Itself allows such gctjoos to be taken 
by the Governor or hjs or her designee. 
<c> The jssuqnce of go Executive Order pursuant to subsection Cal shall not be 
sublect to Chapter 10.3 <commencing wltb Section 35122. Divisloo 4. Title J of the 
Goyeromept Code or the provisions of goy other state law governing salqrv setting for 
stgte officers god employees. 
(d) As used IQ tbis section I the term ·employee· or ·state employee' includes those 
employees defined in Government Code Section l9815Cd). 
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State California budgeting is neither timely nor tidy. Priorities collide, con-
Budgeting flict and compete for cash in a state that, with each sunrise, is growing 
is Messy more complicated and populous. 
Resolution of budget disputes is hampered by a state constitutional re-
quirement that two-thirds of the members of each legislative house ap-
prove the budget bill that goes to the governor. California is one of only 
three states that require substantially more than simple-majority ap-
proval from a legislature for routine passage of a budget. It also is one of 
only six states that require significantly more than a simple majority for 
approval of revenue increases. (See Figures 1 and lA.) Consequently, a 
minority of California legislators in either house can hold up passage of a 
budget indefinitely by failing to supply needed "aye" votes. 
Figure 1 
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Figure lA 
COMPARING BUDGETING PROCEDURES AMONG THE 50 STATES 
STATE BALANCEll BUDGETS: 
CONSTITUTIOJ'\AL AND STATUTORY PHOVISJONS 
GUBERNATORIAL AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY 
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Gubernatorial Authority Legislative Authority 
Governor Legislature Governor Can reduce Votes required 
must submit a must pass a must sign a Governor budget without Restrictions to ovdride Votes required Votes required 
balanced balanced balanced May carry has line legislative on budget gubernatorial to pass revenue to pass 
State budget budget budget over deficit item veto approval reductions veto Increase budget 
Alabama ............ c.s c,s C,S • • ATB Majority elected Majority Majority ... 
AlasJ.:a .............. s s • • • . .. 3/4 elected (a) Majority elected Majority elected . . . 
Arizona ............ c c c • (b) • • ... (c) 213 elected 1/2 elected l/2 elected 
Arkansas ........... s s s • ... ATB,MR Majority elected 3/4 elected 3/4 elected . . . 
California ........... c • • . .. • 213 elected 213 elected 213 elected . . . . .. 
Colorado ........... c c • • 213 elected Maiority present Maiority present ... 
Connecticut ......... s s • • MR 2/3 elected MaJority present (d) MaJOrity present (d) . . . ... 
Ddawart ...•..•.... c c c • • (e) • 3/S elected 3/S elected Majority elected ... 
Florida ...........•. s c s • • (f) 213 elected Majority Majority ... 
Geor£11 ........•.... c c c • • ATB 213 elected Majority Majority ... 
Hawaii ............. c.s c.s • • ... 213 elected Majority elected Majority elected (B) . . . 
Idaho .............. c c • • ... 213 elected Majority Majority . . . . . . 
Illinois .............. c c • . . . ... 3/S elected Majority elected Majority elected (h) . . . 
Indiana ............. c c c • ... Majority Majority Majority . . . . . . 
Iowa ............... c c • • ATB 213 elected Majority Majority . . . ... 
Kansas ............. c c c • • MR (i) 213 elected Majority elected Majority ... 
Kentucky ........... c.s c c • • 2/3 elected Majority elected Majority present . . . ... 
Loulsana ............ c,s s C,S • • • MR 213 present 2/3 elected 1/2 elected 
Maine .............. s c s . . . . . . ... ATB (j) 213 present Majority elected (k) 
Maryland ........... c c • ... 0) Majority Majority . . . . . . . . . 
Massachusetts ....... c c c • • • ... 213 present Majority Majority (m) 
Michigan ........... c c c • . . . ... 2/3 elected Majority elected Majority elected . . . 
Minnesota .......... s s • • MR 2/3 elected Majority elected Majorit)' elected ... 
Mississippi .......... s s s • • MR 2/3 elected 213 elected Majority . .. 
Missouri ............ c· c • • ... 213 elected Majority elected Majority elected . . . . . . 
Montana ............ c c • • MR 2/3 elected Majority Majority . . . ... 
Nebra~ka ........... c • . . . ... 3/5 elected Majority 3/S elected . . . . . . . . . 
Jl;evada ............. s c • . .. 2/3 elected Majority Majority . . . . . . . . . 
Nt'l\ Hampshire .... s • • 2/3 elected Majority Majority present . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Ne¥> Jerse) ... c c c • • (n) ... 2/3 ~ected Majority Majority . . . .. . . . 
Jl;e¥> Mexlro ......... c • • (o) ... 2/3 present Majority Majority . . . . . . . . . 
Nt¥> \'ork c . . . (p) . • • (q) ... (q) 2/3 elected Majorit)' Majority . . . . . . . . ... 
North Carolina .. c c • Majority Majority ... 
2/3 elected North llakota . s s s . • ATB Majority (r) Majority (r) 
Ohio ... (s) ... (~) • • ... 31 5 elected Majo;it) clt.:ted Majorily elected . . . . . . . . . . 
OJ..hahoma c.s c c • . ATB 2.-3 elected (t) Majority Majority(!) 
Ort>gon ... c c c • ... (u) 2/3 elected Majority Majority ... 
Penns~ h ani a ........ c.s c . (\) • . . .. 2/3 elected Majorit) ekcttd l\lajority elected . . . 315 tlected Rhode hland ........ c c s • Majority Majority . .. 2/3 present South Carolina .. . .. (\\) c c . • ATB Majority Mr.jority ... 
South IlaJ..nta c c c • . ... 213 elected 2:3 electtd Majority elected . . . 
Tennt,,t't' c c c • . ... Majority elected Majority ckctcd Majorit} elected 
leu, ..... c c • • 2 '3 elected Majority Majority elected 
Vtah s c s • . ATB 2 3 elected Majority Majority . . (\) ;:. 3 pre>ent 
Vermont .. MajMil) Majority 
------· 
STATE BALANCED BUDGETS-Continued 
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Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, Budgetary Processes in the States, 1989. 
Key: C - Constitutional 
S • Statutory 
A TB - Across the board 
MR - Maximum reduction dictated 
• ·Yes 
• .. -No 
(a) Joint session. 
(b) May carry over "casual deficits," i.e., not anticipated. 
(c) Governor may reduce budgets of administration-appointed agencies only. 
(d) Must have quorum. 
(e) Budget reductions are limited to ex«:utive branch only. 
(0 The Governor and elected cabinet may reduce the budget. The reductions must be reported to the 
gislature and advice as to proposed reductions may be offered. 
(g) If general fund expenditure ceiling is exceeded, 2/3 vote required; otherwise majority of elected 
embers. . 
(h) After June 30, 1990, need 3/S to become effective immediately. 
(i) Reductions allowed only to get back to a balanced budget. 
(j) Governor may expend funds up to one year. Certain restrictions apply to ATB reductions. 
(k) For emergency enactment, 2/J votes required. 
(I) Governor has no veto power over the budget bill, but vote of 3/S elected required to override veto 
11 other bills. 
(m) For capital budget, 2/J votes required. 
(n) May not reduce debt service. 






• MR (z) 
• ATB 
• (aa) ATR(aa) 

















(o) May reduce budget of agencies under Governor's control only. 
(p) Technically, the Governor is not required to sign a balanced budget, however, in order to consum-
mate the spring borrowing the Governor must certify that the budget is in balance. 
(q) May reduce budget without approval only for state operations; only restriction on reductions is 
that reductions in aid to localities cannot be made without legislative approval. 
(r) Emergency measures and measures that amend a statute that has been referred or enacted through 
an initiated measure within the last seven years must pass both houses by a 2/3 majority . 
(s) There is no constitutional or statutory requirement that the Governor submit or the legislature enact 
a balanced budget. There is a constitutional requirement that the legislature provide sufficient revenues 
to meet state expenses. The Governor is required by statute to examine monthly the relationship between 
appropriations and estimated revenues and to reduce expenditures to prevent imbalance. 
(t) Emergency measures require a 3/4 majority for override. Budget bills usually require Emergency 
Clauses and therefore require 2/3 vote for passage. 
(u) Governor r«:ommends a biennial budget that is subject to legislative approval. 
(v) May carry over deficit into subsequent year only. 
(w) Formal budget submitted by Budget and Control Board, not Governor. 
(x) May not change legislative intent when reducing budget. 
(y) The Constitution specifies that expenditures shall not exceed revenues at the end of the biennial 
s)criod. 
(z) The Governor has power to withhold allotments of appropriations, but cannot reduce legislative 
appropriations. 
(aa) May reduce spending authority. 
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"The two-thirds vote on spending and taxing bills obviously 
was put there (into the California Constitution) because the 
authors believed a simple majority would create more taxes 
and spending than they would like," says John Ellwood, 
professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley. 
But, he adds, "We have lots of states out there without the two-
thirds vote that have no indication of larger governmental 
sectors than those with the two-thirds." 
"I do not regard that (the two-thirds requirement) as a desir-
able practice because it allows a minority to hold the Legis-
lature hostage," says Allen Schick, professor of public policy 
at the University of Maryland and a leading national expert 
on budgeting. 
If the Legislature were to place a constitutional amendment on the ballot 
to revise the two-thirds budget vote, it would have to do so by a two-thirds 
majority in both houses. The same minority inclined to block passage of a 
budget could block such a revision. Senator Bill Lockyer, D-Hayward, has 
proposed a constitutional amendment, SCA6, to permit passage of state 
budgets by simple majorities. It has cleared the Senate and is pending in 
the Assembly. 
Thegovernor'sinitiativedidnotproposethisconstitutionalchange, 
although a simple-majority vote likely would expedite passage of 
the budget. 
Of the last 20 budgets enacted in California, only five met the state's 
constitutional deadline for June 15 passage to the governor's desk. More 
than half of the last 27 budgets were signed in to law after the new 
fiscal year had started. (See Figure 2.) 
Spiced by conflict and debate, this tardy brand of democracy can give the 
appearance of operating in disarray. 
"People confuse neatness with good policy," says Professor 
Ellwood. "The public and press tend to assume an efficient 
system is one where things get done on time. Wilson's plan 
clearly appeals to a feeling on the part of Americans that the 
system, because it's politics, is too slow. Deadlines are missed 
and all that sort of stuff. California, lihe all of America, faces 
real, substantive problems. Americans always, when they 
can't agree on substance, decide to debate the process." 
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Figure 2 
CALIFORNIA STATE BUDGET, 1965-1992: ADJUSTED FOR 
INFLATION AND POPULATION GROWTH 
Inflation Adjusted 
Date Passed Total Budgeta Populationb ( $ Billions) 
Year Bill/Chpt # and Chaptered ($ Billions> (Millions) Budget Per Capitac 
1965-66 AB 500/757 6-18 6-30 4.0 18.5 13.6 735 
1966-67 SB 1XX/2 6-30 6-30 4.7 18.8 15.1 803 
1967-68 AB 303/500 6-29 6-30 5.0 19.2 15.2 792 
1968-69 SB 240/430 6-28 6-29 5.7 19.4 16.2 835 
1969-70 SB 255/355 7-3 7-3 6.3 19.8 16.7 843 
1970-71 AB 525/303 7-4 7-4 6.6 20.0 16.3 815 
1971-nd SB 207/266 7-2 7-3 6.7 20.4 15.5 760 
1972-73 SB 50/156 6-15e 6-22 7.4 20.6 16.1 782 
1973-74 AB 110/129 6-28 6-30 9.3 20.9 18.5 885 
1974-75 58 1525/375 6-28 6-30 10.3 21.2 18.6 877 
1975-76 SB 199/62 6-26 7-1 11.5 21.5 19.1 888 
1976-77 SB 1410/320 7-1 7-2 12.6 21.9 19.7 900 
1977-78 AB 184/219 6-24 6-30 14.0 22.4 20.4 911 
1978-79 AB 2190/359 7-5 7-6 18.8 22.8 25.3 1,110 
1979-80 58 190/259 7-12 7-13 21.5 23.3 26.2 1,124 
1980-81 AB 2020/510 7-16 7-16 24.5 23.8 27.1 1,139 
1981-82 SB 110/99 6-15e 6-28 25.0 24.3 25.8 1,062 
1982-83 AB 21/326 6-30 6-30 25.3 24.8 24.7 996 
1983-84 SB 123/324 7-19 7-21 26.8 25.3 21.4 846 
1984-85 AB 2313/258 6-15e 6-27 31.0 25.8 27.6 1,070 
1985-86 SB 150/111 6-l3e 6-28 35.0 26.4 30.0 1,136 
1986-87 AB 3217/186 6-12e 6-25 38.1 27.0 31.6 1,170 
1987-88 SB 152/135 7-1 7-7 40.5 27.7 32.2 1,162 
1988-89 AB 224/33 6-30 7-8 44.6 28.3 33.8 1,194 
1989-90 SB 165/93 6-29 7-7 48.6 29.1 35.2 1,210 
1990-91 SB 899/467 7-29 7-31 54.4 30.0 40.3* 1,343* 
1991-92 AB 222/118 6-21/7-4 7-16 55.7 30.4* 39.5* 1,299* 
a Total Budget dollars from the Governor's Budget Summary. 
b Population as of July 1, the beginning of the fiscal year. 
c Inflation Adjusted Budget divided by Population equals Per Capita 
d First year Budget was to be enacted by June 15. 
e Met requirements of Article IV, Sec. 12(c) of the Constitution. 
* Estmated figures, computation of final figures will be available next year. 
Source: California Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Committee 
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Flirting The California Constitution requires an initiative to stick with a single 
with the subject:" An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not 
Single-Subject be submitted to the electors or have any effect." (Article II, Section 8d.) 
.Rule 
The governor's proposed initiative reflects two primary themes. Sections 
4 and 5 contain constitutional amendments to revise budgeting proce-
dures; sections 6 through 21 would overhaul the state Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code to reduce welfare costs. 
A dissimilarity in these two missions, one constitutional, one statutory, 
could violate the single-subject requirement, rendering the initiative vul-
nerable to legal challenge. 
"I find this wedding of welfare issues with increases in 
budget control to be a sort of sleight-of-hand effort," said Jon 
Ebeling, professor of political science at California State 
University, Chico. "These are things the governor would like 
to have 'in order to more efficiently manage the state,' but the 
budget is really a political document. It's not solely a techni-
cal problem .... I find it kind of unfair, frankly." 
The California Taxpayers' Association, a business-oriented 
lobby supporting the proposed initiative, counters that "wel-
fare reform and budget reform are essentially the same issue." 
It explains that budgeting procedures cannot be overhauled 
without repealing mandates for growth in welfare spending. 
(See Appendix A.) 
The opening paragraphs of the proposed initiative also make 
the argument that welfare and budgeting are joined: "No 
matter how robust our economy becomes, the state will not be 
able to finance existing programs at current levels with pro-
jected tax revenues. This is why welfare reform and budget re-
form are one and the same." (See Appendix B for full text.) 
But there is room for argument. "I don't agree that welfare 
reform and budget reform are the same thing," said Jeffrey 
Chapman, director of the Sacramento Center for the U niver-
sity of Southern California's School of Public Administra-
tion. "In my opinion, this violates the single subject." 
Moving Up the The initiative would require the governor to propose a new budget to the 
Budget Date Legislature by March 1 each year instead of January 10. 
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"The amount of time available for the Legislature to consider 
the budget falls from about 21 weeks to about 15 weeks," 
comments Ron Snell, director of fiscal programs for the 
National Conference of State Legislatures. "The only other 
large state with such a short period is New York, with 10 
weeks for budget consideration. The brevity of this period, 
accordingtothegovernorofNew York and others, isoneofthe 
major problems with the New York system, forcing late 
budgets year after year. Shortening the California budget de-
liberations is likely to increase problems, not resolve them. 
New York is now considering lengthening its budget period. 
"The revised schedule would also allow perhaps the latest 
budget submission in the country. Forty-five states require 
a submission with( in) one month of the convening of theses-
sion. Thirty-five states require the budget to be submitted 
within two weeks of the beginning of the session. No other 
large state would allow so late a submission of the budget." 
Each year, fiscal subcommittees in both houses have held public hearings 
to pass judgment on the details ofthe governor's budget proposals, guided 
by a comprehensive analysis produced late in February by the Legislative 
Analyst's Office. Steve Larson, staff director of the state Senate Budget 
and Fiscal Review Committee, says 12 weeks of hearings would be 
squeezed into about six weeks under the governor's plan. "Huge parts of 
the budget would have to be approved without any review at all," he says. 
This year, the Senate leadership worked out a tentative schedule that 
would condense budget deliberations into two months, with the aim of 
passing a budget bill to the governor by May 1. However, the plan allows 
six weeks of"wiggle room" for big-ticket negotiations before the constitu-
tional deadline, a factor missing from the governor's proposed time sched-
ule. 
Chico State's Ebeling calls the March 1 date "nonsensical" 
and without organizational rationale. "(This would) increase 
pressure on the Legislature by reducing the time it had to 
work. One of the problems in passing a budget is trying to 
figure out what the hell's in there." 
The Fine Print Chapman of USC noted a small change: The initiative says ifthegover-
nor's spending proposals exceed revenues, the governor must recommend 
"sources from which the additional revenues shall be provided," instead of 
the current should be provided. 
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"It centralizes in the governor's office the ability to name 
where an additional revenue source comes from," Chapman 
said of the substitute wording. ({'Shall' means no discussion 
on this. It requires legislative action to pass it, but the 
Legislature could not substitute an alternative revenue source. 
It seems to take away discretion." 
However, George Gorton, strategist for the campaign to qualify and pass 
the initiative, said its drafters proposed changing "should" to "shall" only 
for stylistic reasons and that it would have no impact on the budget 
process. 
Failure to Meet Under the initiative, if the Legislature failed to meet the June 15 dead-
the June 15 line for sending a budget to the governor, the governor and legislators 
Deadline would have to forfeit their salaries and travel and living expenses until the 
budget was passed and signed. (The governor still would have 12 days to 
sign the budget bill once it reached his desk.) No compensation would be 
paid retroactively. There currently is no penalty for missing the deadline. 
This section is popular among voters. A California Poll released in Feb-
ruary showed eight in 10 Californians believe the governor and legislators 
should work without pay if the deadline is not met. (See Figure 3.) 
Analysts contacted by SOR generally did not find this provision signifi-
cant from a public-policy standpoint. "The salary forfeiture is just some-
thing to get the thing passed; nobody should have any problem with that," 
said USC's Chapman. But Snell of the National Conference of State 
Legislatures called it "a sneer at the Legislature." 
Said Snell: "I don't know of any states that have tried such 
a measure in recent years, but evidence from before the 
American Revolution indicates that losing a salary does not 
force a governor into action. Colonial assemblies tried the 
tactic a number of times, with almost universal failure. So 
the fact the governor's salary would be suspended along with 
the legislators' salaries and expenses is unlikely to induce 
signed budgets. No one has tried this tactic with legislators, 
and its results are unpredictable. But it is an insulting 
tactic, contemptuous of the Legislature, in its implication 
that the threat of loss of salary would whip legislators into a 
spirit of obedience to the governor." 
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Figure 3 
THE CALIFORNIA POLL 
Penalize Leaders if Budget Delayed? 
If a state budget were not passed by June 15 each year, should the governor and state 
legislators forfeit their salaries and per diem payments until the state budget is passed? 
Oppose No opinion 
Statewide 83% 13% 4% 
Democrats 79% 16% 5% 
Republicans 87% 9% 4% 
Give Governor Special Powers? 
Should the governor be permitted to declare a fiscal emergency if the Legislature does not 
pass a state budget? 
Favor Oppose No opinion 
Statewide 30% 66% 4% 
Democrats 17% 79% 4% 
Republicans 43% 53% 4% 
Who Has More Support? 
IfWilson and the Legislature are at odds as to how to reduce the budget deficit, and you didn't 
know anything about the specifics of the matter, whose position would you be more inclined 
to support? 
Legislature Governor No opinion 
Statewide 
Jan. 1992 54% 32% 14% 
Jan. 1991 47% 38% 15% 
Democrats 
Jan. 1992 70% 16% 14% 
Jan. 1991 64% 25% 11% 
Republicans 
Jan. 1992 38% 47% 15% 
Jan. 1991 33% 51% 16% 
The statewide telephone survey of 1,028 adults, including 483 Democrats and 449 Republi-
cans, was conducted January 13-18. The margin of error is 4.5 percentage points. 
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A State of If the budget were not signed by July 1, the governor could declare a state 
Fiscal of fiscal emergency and return to use of the prior year's budget. The prior-
Emergency year budget would be adjusted to fully fund Proposition 98's education re-
quirements, state debt service and payments to local governments cover-
ing losses for the homeowners' property-tax exemption and state-man-
dated costs, as required by the state Constitution. 
As one result of returning to the prior-year budget, a governor could con-
tinue existing spending for favored projects at higher levels than legisla-
tors might prefer. 
In a sharp departure from current practice, the governor during this fis-
cal emergency could take steps to reduce health and welfare benefits and 
other "entitlements" now protected by statute to bring the budget into bal-
ance. (Entitlements are government services that qualifying Californians 
are entitled to receive.) The governor could propose cuts in any category 
except the constitutionally protected areas (Proposition 98, debt service 
and payments to local goverments for the homeowners' exemption and 
state mandates). 
He or she also could issue an executive order to cut by 5 percent the pay of 
state employees who are not covered by collective-bargaining agreements, 
as well as the pay of any employees whose agreements permitted the cut-
backs. 
The prior-year budget would remain in effect until the Legislature 
passed and the governor signed a budget bill. The new round of 
budget cuts proposed by the governor would become effective in 
30 days unless a budget bill was passed and signed. But the 
governor could veto the budget bill, and subsequent budget ver· 
sions, in a drive to prevail. 
Californians seem at odds with these provisions. The California Poll 
showed 54 percent of those surveyed would be more inclined to side with 
the Legislature than Wilson if a stalemate developed over reducing the 
budget deficit. Sixty-six percent opposed allowing the governor to declare 
a fiscal emergency if the Legislature failed to pass a budget. (Figure 3.) 
The extent of change intended by this initiative is clouded somewhat by 
its wording. It ignores a possibility the Legislature might override a veto 
by the governor to enact the budget bill. Instead, the initiative states that 
the budget bill must be si{Pled by the governor if a loss of pay or the 
governor's own budget-balancing proposals are to be averted. 
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On its face, omitting the veto option from this proposed constitutional 
amendment eliminates its use in these specific budget areas, the Legisla-
tive Analyst's Office said in a Jan. 13 review. The issue "would be subject 
to judicial interpretation," it added. (See Appendix C.) 
The campaign's Gorton asserts there is "absolutely nothing in the initia-
tive that weakens the Legislature's ability to override the governor with 
two-thirds vote." That intent would have been clearer if the initiative had 
referred to budget bills being enacted rather than signed. 
What Others Long-term policy ramifications of this proposed initiative hinge on the 
are Saying discretion of the state's chief executives. All sides agree it clearly would 
shift control from the Legislature to the governor. 
'~governor could convey the power to declare an emergency 
upon himself simply by vetoing budget bills as they are 
presented on June 15 or after and in this way take control of 
the state budget in any or every year." 
- Ron Snell, National Conference of State Legislatures. 
"To my knowledge, in no other state do provisions exist giving 
the governor such extraordinary budget-making authority 
as he would have under this proposal, especially since he 
could apparently unilaterally provoke a 'fiscal emergency' by 
not signing a budget bill by July 1. There is a potential in the 
proposed reform for a lot of political gamesmanship between 
the governor and Legislature, rather than serious attempts 
at resolving differences. For example, there is the obvious 
threat that the governor can hold out, of refusing to sign the 
budget by July 1, and thereby provoking a 'fiscal emergency' 
if the Legislature passes a budget not to his liking." 
-Preston Niblack, RAND. 
"It's a real power grab by the governor, no question about it. 
The Legislature could balance the budget and send it to the 
governor. If he chose for any reason not to sign it, he could go 
into this new state of fiscal emergency and changes could 
take place as he proposes to make them. The only thing the 
Legislature could do would be send out another balanced 
budget and the governor would still have to sign it or it 
wouldn't take effect. He has, in effect, total control over the 
state's expenditure program." 
-A Alan Post, former legislative analyst. 
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"What this reform is all about is to switch power from the 
Legislature to the governor, so if a governor is a conservative, 
after this reform you would expect more conservative policies. 
On the other hand, if you had a Republican Legislature and 
liberal Democratic governor, the Democrats might love such 
a plan as this. It's not obvious to me on policy grounds that it 
would lead to more conservative versus more liberal policies." 
-John Ellwood, professor, Graduate School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley. 
"Obviously, this is going to strengthen the governor's hand 
immensely. As it is now, even without these changes, the 
governor pretty much controls the budget process. What 
comes out at the end tends to be pretty much what the 
governor wanted in the beginning. It seems to me this will 
give the governor an even greater amount of influence and 
control over the process. Not only would it further weaken the 
Legislature's role in the budget process, but with Proposition 
140 (the successful term-limit initiative) ... and lack of expe-
rience (among new legislators) in budget issues that we're 
going to have very shortly, this would just compound the gov-
ernor's role in getting his way in the budget process." 
- Charles Price, author of "California Government Today» and professor of 
political science, California State University, Chico. 
"The bottom line on this is, it's a heavy-duty consolidation of 
power into the governor's office. It's clearly taking powers 
away from the Legislature and giving them to the governor .... 
and it's not very well written, by the way. I am not convinced 
that we ought to be asking state employees to subsidize 
through salary cuts the programs that the state undertakes. 
It's a cowardly way to make a budget decision." 
-Jeffrey Chapman, USC School of Public Administration. 
"I think (this) is highly unusual and is, in my judgment, a 
rather questionable transfer of power to the governor. A more 
appropriate remedy (if the budget bill is late) would be that 
the budget for the previous year shall continue in effect, and 
stop there. Why should the governor's proposals have a 
special priority if the Legislature has not adopted a budget? 
If the Legislature has not been able to obtain a two-thirds 
vote, the governor's own plan would take effect unless he signs 
another plan. I don't think that's cricket." 
-Allen Schick, professor of public policy, University of Maryland. 
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Most experts contacted for comments on the initiative's 
budgeting sections expressed concerns about the wisdom of 
shifting budgeting powers from the legislative to the execu-
tive branch. But Steven Hayward, research and editorial di-
rector of the Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, had 
a differing view: 
" ... The governor's measure will restore a full measure of 
accountability for public spending, where none exists ade-
quately now .... Public choice theory reminds us that legisla-
tures are especially vulnerable to special interest combina-
tions. The executive, by the very nature of representing all of 
the people and having to respond to all interests ... is less 
vulnerable to these kinds of pressures, and is in a better 
position to balance overall spending requirements .... The 
defect of the initiative is that (it) excludes the Proposition 98 
education earmark from the 'fiscal emergency' provisions. 
As education is nearly half of the general fund, it should be 
included .... I suggest two (alternatives): abolish all earmark-
ing, so that all interests will have to justify year by year why 
they and not another should get a share of the budget; second, 
split the budget into separate appropriation bills for each 
major department .... Spending grows about 2 percent a year 
slower in states with these budget features." 
(See Appendix D for complete text). 
Pulling the Trigger 
Since 1990, state law has permitted auto-
matic spending cuts when revenues lag. 
This "trigger'' can be "pulled" on July 1 if 
the administration's calculations in May 
show revenues will fall more than 0.5 per-
cent below the cost of authorized services. 
Cuts are pegged to the percentage of the 
shortfall, up to a maximum of 4 percent. 
(Constitutionally protected spending, the 
same four areas protected from cuts in the 
proposed initiative, are exempt.) 
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The triggerwassqueezedin 1991-92. Inter· 
estingly, Governor Wilson has recom-
mended against using it in 1992-93, al-
though it could cut spending more than 
$820 million. Wilson explained in his Gov-
ernor's Budget Summary: "Mter many 
successive years of'unallocated' or'across-
the-board' cuts, most state programs and 
departments have made substantial re-
ductions in the level of services. Further 
reductions of this sort will simply reduce 
the effectiveness of remaining programs." 
Fiscal The proposed initiative would allow the governor to declare a fiscal emer-
Emergencies gency after the budget is enacted if any of the following conditions occur at 
the end of the first, second or third quarters of the fiscal year: 
• General-fund revenues fall at least 3 percent below revenues 
estimated by the state Department of Finance when the budget 
was enacted, 
• General-fund spending exceeds budgeted amounts by 3 percent, 
or 
• Revenues fall at least 1.5 percent below estimates and spending 
exceeds budgeted amounts by at least 1.5 percent. 
The governor could move to reduce spending in more than half of the ar-
eas addressed by the budget, including health and welfare "entitlements." 
Again, he could not cut the constitutionally protected areas: Proposition 
98's spending for schools, homeowners' exemption losses to local govern-
ments, debt service and funding for state mandates. The governor's 
reductions would take effect in 30 days unless alternative budget-balanc-
ing plans were passed by a two-thirds vote of each house and signed by the 
governor. 
During a state of fiscal emergency, the governor could issue executive 
orders to reduce, by up to 5 percent, the salaries of state employees who are 
not covered by union-negotiated agreements, and the salaries of those 
whose agreements permit the cut. 
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The state Department of Finance, an arm of the administration, puts 
together the governor's budget proposals and revenue forecasts. Its fore-
casts have proven optimistic in recent years, resulting in significant 
operating shortfalls. 
The Commission on State Finance calculates that actual revenue 
co1lections fell short of Department of Finance forecasts by more than 3 
percent in 1989-90 (3.8 percent) and in 1990-91 (8.4 percent). This year, 
1991-92, receipts may ultimately fall short of the forecast by 7.4 percent. 
These revenue forecasts accompany the "May revision" used to craft the 
final version of the budget. The magnitude ofthe shortfalls suggests that 
in 1990-91 and 1991-92, the conditions for a "fiscal emergency" would have 
been met within the first two quarters of the fiscal year. 
Conversely, revenues were higher than initially forecast in 1984-85, 1986-
87 and 1988-89. In 1985-86, they were roughly on target, the commission 
reports. 
Spending is a different story. Changes are less volatile in this area and 
seldom exceed forecasts by the magnitudes cited in the initiative. Since 
1984-85, spending has never exceeded forecasts by as much as 3 percent, 
the commission says. But the commission in December reported that, for 
the first time since 1984-85, costs this fiscal year exceeded forecasts by 
more than the 1.5 percent figure cited in the initiative. The shortfall would 
have been $650 million to meet the 1.5 percent criterion; it was $850 mil-
lion. 
"Litigation on this is going to be amazing. Suppose revenues 
were down 2 percent and spending was up by 1 percent- that 
doesn't fit in (with the initiative's conditions for declaring a 
fiscal emergency). It's poor draftsmanship more than any-
thing else." 
-Jeffrey Chapman, USC School of Public Administration. 
If the Finance Department's revenue estimates were unduly rosy, the 
chief executive would be in a position within a few months to impose 
cutbacks in programs that he or she considered low in priority. The same 
would be true if costs were severely underestimated, as sometimes has 
happened with big-ticket items, most notably Medi-Cal. If the Legislature 
objected to the governor's cutback strategy and offered an alternative ap-
proach to budget balancing, the governor could allow his own plan to 
stand. The initiative, again, makes no mention ofthe option of an override. 
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Today, a budget stalemate means inaction until all sides can agree upon 
a solution, always subject to retooling by the governor's line-item veto 
authority. Under the proposed initiative, the governor could put his own 
budget strategies into place, using his veto power to avert all legislative 
approaches. 
"This is authoritarianism, frankly. This is just not appropri-
ate behavior. It increases terrifically his power. That's just 
way too much power, I think, to have a balanced legislative-
executive sort of group." 
-Jon Ebeling, professor of political science, California State University, Chico. 
"It's not uncommon in the states that the governor has signifi-
cant powers to reduce some expenditures to bring the budget 
back into balance. There's no uniform practice, though, as to 
what happens. What I prefer would be some restrictions on 
what the governor can do. For instance, it (budget cutting) has 
to be pro rata, not more than 'n' percent; the governor cannot 
take more than a certain percentage out of any program, as 
opposed to this (initiative), which invites the governor to have 
a hit list. A hit list might be composed of things the Legisla-
ture wants. I would prefer to constrain that power to ensure it 
is used exclusively to restore budgetary balance and not to 
enable the governor's budgetary priorities to prevail vis-a-vis 
those of the Legislature." 
-Allen Schick, professor of public policy, University of Maryland. 
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Contact: Ron Roach 916-441-0490 
cal-Tax endorses Taxpayer Protection Act 
February 7, 1992 
The California Taxpayers• Association today announced its 
support of Governor Pete Wilson's efforts to reform the state 
budget process and turn off what he has called "autopilot" 
spending. 
In endorsing the Wilson-sponsored legislative package, Cal-
Tax President Larry McCarthy said the association intends to 
support Wilson's proposed Government Accountability and Taxpayer 
Protection Act of 1992 initiative unless the Legislature acts on 
an equal or better plan. 
"It appears to be a choice of this or higher taxes," 
McCarthy said. "The system needs fixing and the governor came 
forward with a plan that has merit. We are respectful of the 
legislative process and would prefer to see the reforms enacted 
without the expense of a ballot initiative. If someone believes 
there is a better way, we'll look at it." 
Cal-Tax agrees with the governor that welfare reform and 
budget reform are essentially the same issue, McCarthy said, 
because necessary change in the budget process cannot be achieved 
without repealing statutory mandates for automatic spending 
escalators for programs with rapid caseload growth. 
Without action to rid the budget process of what the 
governor calls "autopilot" spending on welfare and other 
programs, pressure for higher taxes will continue to build, 
McCarthy said. 
The governor's proposal is designed to give the Legislature 
-- and the governor -- financial incentive to pass a state budget 
bill on time. The state's fiscal integrity has been threatened in 
the past by stalemates that have forced the state to go well into 
the first month of the new fiscal year without a budget and its 
authority to pay the bills. 
Under the initiative, legislators and the governor would 
forfeit pay and per diem for every day that they violate certain 




Furthermore, if the Legislature is deadlocked on the budget 
bill into the new fiscal year, the initiative would give the 
governor emergency powers to use the prior year's budget, with 
the ability to maintain balance with spending cuts. The 
Legislature, by two-thirds vote, could override a governor's 
emergency actions. 
Cal-Tax also supports the initiative's proposal to reform 
the welfare system with a plan designed to break the cycle of 
welfare dependency and provide incentives for teen-age parents to 
fin ish high school and able-bodied adults to seek empl-oyment. 
The initiative also would remove California's lure of higher 
welfare benefits for those who migrate from other states that pay 
lesser benefits. 
McCarthy noted an August 1991. Cal-Tax Research Brief on 
welfare's alarming growth in the 1980s -- a rate of growth double 
the increase in population -- and the need to lessen dependency. 
A system that is open-ended with comparatively high levels 
of grants encourages dependency, provides a strong disincentive 
against seeking employment and promotes disintegration of the 
family, McCarthy said. "It is expensive and, worse than that, 
ineffective," he added. 
The initiative would add to the california Constitution a 
declaration by the people that "rapidly rising costs of public 
assistance must be controlled if overall government spending is 
to be reduced. Public assistance is not a fundamental right; it 
is a benefit dependent upon eligibility and compliance with 
reasonable regulations designed to minimize the burden upon 
taxpayers." 
It is clear that there will be perennial state budget 
problems unless the governor and Legislature -- or the people via 
an initiative -- make structural changes to provide flexibility 
needed to budget spending within available revenues. 
Cal-Tax is a 67-year-old nonpartisan, nonprofit association 
that opposes unnecessary taxation and advocates efficiency in the 
delivery of quality government services. 
# 
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ArneMcl.'n'len+ Jbf 
C,- \ v £'" GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND ~~ t. (.,- DTA:UAYER PROTECTION Ac:r 01!' 1992 
DEC 1 8 i99L. . . . b . d h 1 · d · h - Th~s ~nlt~at~ve ~s su m1tte to t e peep e 1n accor ance Wlt. 
the provisioAnbi'f Article II, Section 8 of the Constitution. 
INITIATIVE COOR JI,N 
ATTORNEY~SA~~2tqi\ive measure expressly amends the Constitution by 
amending and adding sections thereto, amends, repeals, and adds 
--se-ctions to the Welfare and Institutions Code: therefore, existing 
provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in striltee~t ty~e 
and new provisions proposed are printed in underscore type to 
indicate that they are new. 
PROPOSED LAW 
SECTION l. This initiative measure shall be known and may be 
cited as the Government Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act 
of 1992. 
SECTION 2. Despite repeated attempts by the people to limit 
the size of government programs, the public sector continues to 
grow faster than our ability to pay for it. california's 
taxpayers must now work well into the fifth month of the year to 
earn enough income to pay all our taxes. 
·~--' •. . 
This is a burden that can only become more and more onerous. 
The reasons why are autopilot spending programs, or entitlements 
-- the prime engine driving California's perennial overspending. 
California's fiscal imbalance is also reflected by a growing 
social imbalance. In the past few years, welfare caseloads have 
escalated at a growth rate four times faster than our general 
population. 
While california's tax-receivers grow quickly in numbers, 
california taxpayers are starting to flee our State. This leaves 
California with proportionally fewer taxpayers, and State 
government in a perpetual budget crisis. No matter how robust our 
economy becomes, the State will not be able to finance existing 
programs at current levels with projected tax revenues. 
This is why welfare reform and budget reform are one and the 
same. The state's fiscal future is in jeopardy and reforms of the 
budget process, including reform of significant programs of public 
expenditure which have heretofore mandated automatic increases 
without regard to the capacity of the state fisc, must be adopted 
immediately. 
We are willing to finance essential services. We believe 
that the State has a responsibility to look after the welfare· of 
individuals in need. But we declare that every citizen~1so has -
- l-
an obligation to do their best to contribute to the welfare of 
society. 
Nearly 77 percent of the State general fund budget is spent 
on primary and secondary education, and health and welfare 
programs. While education accounts for 44.9 percent of that 
budget, an existing constitutional initiative (Proposition 98) 
prohibits any substantial reduction in educational funding. 
The existing budget process is not designed to reduce 
spending; there is no expeditious mechanism for correcting 
spending during the fiscal year when revenue projections·are·not 
met or caseload growth exceeds projections. 
The people believe it is time to take our destiny in our own 
hands. 
In order to restore accountability to our government, we the 
people further find that it is necessary to reform the budget 
process and the welfare system and do hereby enact The Government 
Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992. 
SECTION 3. Section 31 of Article I of the california 
Constitution is added, to read: 
31. The ~eople of the State of california find and 
declare that l1miting the tax burden and reducing the. 
size and cost of government are matters of statewide 
concern and that substantial reform of the state's 
bud et recess, includin addressin ma'or automatic 
spen 1ng regu1rements, 1s necessary. 
The rapidll risinl costs of publicassistance must_ 
be controlled i overa 1 government siending is to be 
reduced. Public assistance is not aundamental right; 
it is a benefit dependent upon eli$ibiiity·and · 
com~liance with reasonable reguiat1ons designed· to·-
min1mize the burden upon taxpayers._ · 
'l'he present open-ended welfare system andthe 
comparatively high level of caiifornia 1s arants . 
encourage intergenerationai welfare depen enfl, provide 
a strong disincentive against recipients.see · ng. -
employment, and promote disintegration of the family • 
. - . ._ ~ .....,. ' " 
Welfare vas designed and intended~primarily as4a:. 
safety net to provide emergency aid for a !lilted tlie. 
Welfare must be returned to its pro3!r role as,a 
transition to aalnful employment anself-determination. 
and must inclu e an element of mutual obligation between 
government and the recipient. 
- 2-
SECTION 4. Section 12 of Article IV, of the California 
Constitution is amended, to read: 
12. (a) Wieaia eae firae !eft eaye ef eaeft ealeAear 
year, !he Governor shall, by March l of each calendar 
year, submit to the Legislature, with an explanatory 
message, a budget for the ensuing fiscal year containing 
itemized statements for recommended State expenditures 
and estimated State revenues. If recommended 
expenditures exceed estimated revenues, the Governor 
shall recommend the sources from which the additional 
revenues afte~le shall be provided. 
(b)· The Governor and the Governor-elect may 
require a State agency, officer or employee· to furnish 
whatever information is deemed necessary to prepare the 
budget. 
(c) The budget shall be accompanied by a budget 
bill itemizing recommended expenditures. The bill shall 
be introduced immediately in each house by the persons 
chairing the committees that con.side.r appropriations. 
The Legislature shall pass the bttdg•t bill by midnight 
on June 15 of each year. Notwithstanding Article III,. 
section 4, Article IV, section 4, if the Legislature · 
fails to pass a budget bill by June is,.the Governor and 
the members of the Leiislature shall forfeit all salary, 
travel ex;enses, and Ivina e;ceenses until-such time as 
a budget iii is passed an s1gned by the.GOvernor. No: 
compensation shall be paid retroactively to the Governor 
or the meliibers of the Legislature for·salary; travel-
expenses, and living e~enses forfeited undir the · 
provisions of this sectl.on. 
(d) No bill except the budget bill .. y contain 
more than one item of appropriation, -aDd ~t for one·· 
certain, expressed purpose. Appropriatiou .. from-the-
General Pund of·the State, except appropr~ations-for~the­
public schools, are void unless passed~n~ach·house•by~ 
rollcall vote entered in the journal, two ·thirc!a. of.. the 
aabership concurring. - ... -
(e) The Legislature aay control the•submission-; 
approval, and enforc-nt of budgeta~ud:..the=filing:;-.of. 
claims for all State agencies. 
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Pursuant to Elections Code Section 3504, we have reviewed the proposed 
initiative cited as "Government Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act of 
1992" (AG File No. SA 91 RF 0038, Amendment No. 1). The initiative makes 
significant changes to (1} the state's budget process and (2) state and local 
public assistance programs. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS 
STATE BUDGET PROCESS 
The measure amends the state constitution to revise the state's budget 
process and increases the Governor's control and authority over spending 
during the fiscal year. 
Change in Date of Budget Submission 
The measure changes the deadline for the Governor to submit the annual 
budget for the coming fiscal year to the Legislature from January 10 to 
March 1. The existing deadline for the legislature to pass a budget (June 15} 
would not change. 
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Prohibition of Legislative and Gubernatorial Pay and Expenses 
The measure prohibits the Governor and the Members of the Legislature 
from collecting their salaries, travel expenses, and living expenses until a 
Budget Bill is enacted, if the Legislature fails to pass the Budget Bill by 
June 15th of any year. The measure also prohibits retroactive payments for 
these expenses after the budget is enacted. 
Governor May Reinstate the Prior-Year Budget if New Budget Not Enacted 
The measure authorizes the Governor to declare a "state of fiscal 
emergency" if the budget has not been signed by July 1. Upon this declara-
tion, the prior-year budget would become the state's "operational budget," 
with certain adjustments, until a new budget is enacted. The amounts in the 
prior-year budget would be adjusted to ensure the continuation of full funding 
for the following purposes: 
• The.minimum state funding requirement for K-14 education under 
Proposition 98. 
• Subventions to local governments to replace revenue lost due to the 
homeowners' property tax exemption. 
• State debt service. 
• Subventions for mandated local costs. 
The measure also enables the Governor to propose reductions to this 
interim operational budget, if needed to bring anticipated spending and 
revenues into balance. These reductions may include reductions in state 
entitlements, such as benefits paid under Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and Medi-Cal, which cannot be reduced without enactment of 
separate legislation under existing law. The four special spending categories 
above would be exempt from these spending reductions, however. Reductions 
also could include state employee salary reductions and furloughs that reduce 
pay by up to 5 percent, except for employees covered under a collective 
bargaining agreement (unless the agreement allows such cuts). 
These reductions would take effect 30 days after they are transmitted to 
the Legislature, unless the new Budget Act is passed and signed by the 
Governor by that time. 
Reductions to the Enacted Budget 
After the budget has been enacted, the Governor could declare a fiscal 
emergency and propose spending reductions to bring spending and revenues into 
balance, if any one of the following criteria is met at the end of the first, 
second, or third quarter of the fiscal year: 
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• Cumulative General Fund cash receipts are at least 3 percent below 
budget estimates. 
t Cumulative General Fund spending exceeds budgeted amounts by at least 
3 percent. 
• Cumulative General Fund spending exceeds the budget estimate by at 
least 1.5 percent and cumulative General Fund cash receipts are at 
least 1.5 percent below budget estimates. 
The Governor's budget cuts would be subject to the same conditions as 
reductions to the reinstated prior-year budget discussed above: they could 
reduce spending for state entitlements, but not spending for any of the 
protected spending categories (Proposition 98, subventions for the homeowners' 
exemption, local mandates, and debt service), and they could reduce pay by up 
to 5 percent for employees not protected by a collective bargaining agreement. 
Budget cuts proposed by the Governor would take effect 30 days after they are 
transmitted to the Legislature, unless the Legislature, by two-thirds vote, 
passes alternate legislation to balance spending and revenues, and that 
legislation is signed by the Governor. 
Requirement for the Governor's Signature on Budget-Related legislation 
The measure refers to the Governor signing legislation in four places 
(references are to Section 12 of Article IV of the California Constitution as 
amended by the measure): 
• A fiscal emergency can be declared if the budget is not "passed and 
signed by July 1." [Section 12.2(a}] 
t After declaring a fiscal emergency, the prior-year budget is rein-
stated until "the Legislature passes and the Governor signs" a new 
budget bill. [Section 12.2(a)] 
• Reductions to the prior-year budget take effect in 30 days, unless 
"the Legislature passes the Budget Bill and the bill is signed by the 
Governor." [Section 12.2(b)] 
• Spending cuts proposed by the Governor to resolve fiscal emergencies 
after enactment of a budget take effect in 30 days, unless alterna-
tive legislation is enacted by the Legislature "and that legislation 
is signed by the Governor." [Section 12.5{b}] 
The existing constitutional provisions governing enactment of legisla-
tion (including the budget), however, allow enactment of legislation without 
the Governor's signature under some circumstances, either by an absence of 
gubernatorial action or by the Legislature overriding a Governor's veto. The 
measure would not change these provisions as they generally apply. However, 
on its face the measure eliminates these alternative methods of enactment in 
certain cases (for example, a Budget Bill passed after the Governor has 
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declared a fiscal emergency or for legislation providing an alternative to the 
Governor's proposals for balancing revenues and spending during a post-budget-
fiscal emerg~ncy). This requirement concerning the Governor's signature would 
be subject to judicial interpretation. 
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February 12, 1992 
Rebecca La Vally 
Senate Office of Research 
1020 N Street, Suite 565 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Rebecca: 
I am grateful for the opportunity to comment for the SOR on the Governor's 
budget initiative, especially since my views about the budget process are not 
sympathetic to the legislative branch. 
My general view is that our spending process suffers from some serious 
constitutional defects, that we share with other states and the federal 
government, and therefore that the Governor's initiative, or something very 
like it (which I will try to spell out below), is urgently required. I rest this 
opinion on the view that the Governor's measure will restore a full 
measure of accountability for public spending, where none exists 
adequately now. 
There has been a gradual trend over the last 25 years across the nation, but 
especially pronounced here in California, of weakening the power of the 
executive branch to control spending. At the federal level, the most visible 
aspect of this is the budget act of 197 4, which curtailed the power of the 
President to impound funds, reversing a longstanding prerogative of the 
President. This change means that Congress, and not the executive 
branch, now controls the actual administration of funds, and not just the 
appropriation of funds. There is a separation here between responsibility 
and authority; the executive bears the responsibility for spending, but not 
the authority really to control it. 
The process is different in the states and in California, but the effect is 
largely the same. Here spending is driven by the combination of federal 
mandates, earmarks (Prop 98, 99, etc.), "workload" budgeting and 
automatic COLAs. I will not repeat here the arguments against 
earmarking and COLAs; I refer you instead to the paper I wrote last year 
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for the Claremont Institute entitled "The Deeper Lesson of California's 
Budget Crisis" (enclosed). The relevant point here is that state spending 
proceeds larg,ely without accountability to either the legislative or the 
executive branch. This represents a serious misfunctioning of our 
constitutional system. 
Public choice theory reminds us that legislatures are especially vulnerable 
to special interest combinations. The executive, by the very nature of 
representing all of the people and having to respond to all interests, as 
distinct from the local or parochial interests of the individual legislator, is 
less vulnerable to these kinds of pressures, and is in a better position to 
balance overall spending requirements. As a single entity, there is more 
accountability with the electorate than there is for the legislature. With this 
greater accountability should go the responsibility for controlling spending. 
The defect of the initiative is that is excludes the Proposition 98 education 
earmark from the "fiscal emergency" provisions. As education is nearly 
half of the General Fund, it should be included. 
The alternative to the Governor's measure is to make some constitutional 
changes to the legislative budget process. I suggest two: abolish all 
earmarking, so that all interests will have to justify year by year why they 
and not another should get a share of the budget; second, split the budget 
into separate appropriation bills for each major department or category of 
state spending. I base these ideas on the study of all 50 state budgets 
conducted by former OMB director James Miller and George Mason 
University economist Mark Crain, who found that spending grows about 2 
percent a year slower in states with these budget features. (I have enclosed 
a copy of the Miller-Crain article. I ran it off a computer on-line database, 
so it is a little hard to read.) 
It should be kept in mind that what makes for long term budget problems 
are the margins; a difference in 2 percent a year in either revenue or 
spending growth goes a long way toward determining whether we arrive in 
such a situation as we find ourselves now. Hence, seemingly small 
changes in budget process can make a large difference over time. 
Cordially, 
~?~----P 
Steven Hayward 
